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1 Introduction  
Bounded rationality is an important element of the theory of the firm and the theory of 
institutions in general. The objective of this paper is to provide experimental evidence to 
support the first of these statements. In our experiment we implement a simplified 
version of a mechanism designed to perfectly solve the holdup problem (Maskin and 
Tirole 1999, Maskin and Moore 1999 and Maskin 2002). We test whether this mechanism 
is able to perfectly solve our experimental holdup problem or at least improve economic 
performance. We show that neither is the case: the implementation of the mechanism 
worsens economic performance.  
The theory of the firm has a long tradition. In the 1970s several contributions identified 
the holdup problem as one core element of the theory of the firm (Williamson 1975, 1985, 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978 and Alchian 1984). This strand of literature is known 
as transaction cost economics. Corresponding empirical research has provided an 
impressive amount of findings confirming of the basic hypotheses (cf. Lafontaine and 
Slade 2007 and Shelanski and Klein 1995). Unfortunately, much of the prior transaction 
cost economics literature employed a verbal approach and hence the description of the 
interdependencies between the central variables remained rather vague. The use of 
methods changed substantially with the publication of the seminal paper by Grossman 
and Hart (1986) introducing the property rights model. As in transaction cost economics, 
the property rights approach places the holdup problem at the center of the analysis but 
employs game theoretic tools of analysis. In the years that followed an impressive number 
of game theoretical variations and refinements emerged, meaning that the former 
property rights model evolved into a much broader theory of incomplete contracts. Hart 
and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) are essentially extensions of Grossman and Hart 
(1986). Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2003), Schmitz and Sliwka (2001) and Schmitz (2006) 
provide variations of the property rights model. In addition, a parallel strand of research 
emerged with the aim of solving the holdup problem using contractual solutions. Some of 
the most important of these papers are Hart and Moore (1988) and Edlin and Reichelstein 
(1996). Che and Hausch (1999) show that the proposed solutions to the holdup problem 
are based on the assumption of “selfish investments” and that in case of “cooperative 
investments” no contractual solution exists if players cannot commit not to renegotiate. 
However, Maskin and Tirole (1999), Maskin and Moore and Maskin (2002) show that a 
mechanism exists that is able to solve the holdup problem perfectly, even in the case of 
cooperative investments. As a consequence, this mechanism questions the theoretical 
foundations of the entire theory of incomplete contracts: there is no longer a holdup 
problem because the first-best outcome can always be achieved provided that all players 
have perfect foresight. Although Maskin (2002) emphasizes that the heuristic value of the 
contributions to the theory of incomplete contracts remains unchanged, the interest in 
incomplete contract theory has decreased and some of its main contributors proposed 
aspects other than the incompleteness of contracts are central to the contracting problem; 
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e.g. Hart and Moore (2008, 2009) introduce a semi-behavioral theory of contracts and 
ownership.3 
Parallel to the development of the theory of the firm, the role of bounded rationality has 
also changed. Initially (Williamson 1975, 1985) bounded rationality occupied a central 
position in the theory of the firm; subsequently, however, it essentially disappeared from 
the scene. As early as 1990, Oliver Hart claimed that bounded rationality is not a crucial 
component of the theory of institutions (Hart 1990, 696) and many economists followed 
his assessment by restricting their analysis to standard game theoretic equilibrium 
concepts. Yet Eric Maskin himself (2002, 732) supposes that the rather complicated 
mechanism he introduced may excessively rely on agents’ abilities to foresee future 
payoffs. 
We follow Maskin’s supposition by implementing a special and substantially simplified 
version of his mechanism in our laboratory experiment. We organized the experiment 
such that the participants did not need to calculate parameters that make the mechanism 
workable. At each stage of the game, they simply had to choose between two alternative 
actions, with one sequence of actions being the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium path 
through the game tree. Therefore, we believe that we have provided an ideal environment 
for Maskin’s mechanism to work. However, if the participants in our experiment do not 
exhibit equilibrium play in the majority of cases, we regard this as evidence in favor of the 
bounded rationality hypothesis.  
Some other studies have conducted experimental tests of the holdup model: Hackett 
(1993, 1994), Olcina (2000), Königstein (2001), Sonnemans et al. (2001), Sloof et al. 
(2004, 2006, 2007) Bruttel and Eisenkopf (2009), Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) and Erlei 
and Siemer (2012). Most of these contributions largely confirm the existence of an 
underinvestment problem and analyze additional aspects of the holdup problem. Yet 
none of these papers refers to Maskin’s mechanism.  
Two other papers are more closely related to our study. Aghion et al. (2014) conduct an 
experimental test on the reliability of the Moore-Repullo mechanism which provided the 
basis for Maskin’s mechanism. They find that the mechanism does not reliably induce 
truth telling by the players and that deviations from subgame perfect behavior increase if 
a small amount of uncertainty is introduced. Fehr et al. (2014) is even closer related to 
our model. The authors test another simplified variation of the mechanism discussed in 
Maskin (2002). They find that the mechanism fails to increase the players’ profits. Fehr et 
al.’s paper differs, however, in two respects: (a) their simplification of Maskin’s 
mechanism differs from ours substantially. In particular, they analyze a holdup problem 
with one-sided specific investments and the buyers’ message space consists of eleven 
feasible values. (b) In their effort to explain the failure of the mechanism they emphasize 
reciprocity. In contrast, in our experiment buyers and sellers have to make an investment 
decision and our basic explanation of the actual behavior of the participants is based on 
                                                        
3 The experimental evidence regarding this reference point approach is mixed (cf. Fehr, Hart and Zehnder 
(2009, 2011) and Erlei and Reinhold (2011)).  
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bounded rationality. Since we get similar experimental results, we regard their work as 
complementary to our study. Finally, we have conducted a second treatment in order to 
assess whether another institutional safeguard, vertical integration, provides better 
outcomes.  
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the structure of the 
experimental game, its equilibrium and the experimental procedures. In section 3 we 
present behavioral predictions. The main results of our experiment are described in 
section 4. Because the experimental behavior substantially deviates from equilibrium 
play, we attempt to reconstruct participants’ behavior by applying the logit agent quantal 
response equilibrium to our experimental games in section 5. In section 6 we discuss our 
findings. Finally we present some conclusions and some perspectives for future research.  
2 Experimental design 
2.1 Experimental game 
Motivated by the question of whether the Maskin mechanism can solve the holdup 
problem, this paper compares its effectiveness with the performance of a much simpler 
but inefficient alternative: vertical integration. To answer this research question, we 
implemented two treatments, the Maskin mechanism treatment (MM treatment) and the 
vertical integration treatment (VI treatment).  
The holdup problem considered in this paper consists of the trade relationship between a 
buyer and a seller. Both parties can simultaneously conduct cooperative specific 
investments. If the seller decides to invest, he has to bear a cost of s = 30 and increases the 
buyer’s valuation of the product from v = 50 to v = 100. Accordingly, the overall surplus 
increases by 20 monetary units (“tokens”). The buyer’s costs of investment amount to b = 
15 tokens. By investing the buyer decreases the seller’s production costs from c = 30 to c 
= 10, meaning that the overall surplus increases by 5 tokens. We assume that it is 
impossible to write a complete contingent contract before conducting the investments 
and that investment decisions are unverifiable to third parties. Consequently, we have an 
ordinary holdup problem. 
The Maskin mechanism treatment 
The game we have designed for our economic experiment is a simplified version of the 
mechanism described in Maskin (2002). The main idea behind this mechanism is to solve 
the holdup problem assuming cooperative investments. In the following we describe our 
version of the mechanism and its operation according to conventional game theory. It is 
important to note that the operation of the mechanism depends upon the assumptions of 
perfect rationality and strictly selfish preferences.  
The basic structure of the MM consists of two players, the seller and the buyer, and four 
stages of play: 
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Table 1: Structure of the Maskin mechanism game  
Stage Actions 
Stage 1: Simultaneous investment decisions by the buyer and the seller 
Stage 2: The buyer reports his value and the seller reports his cost 
(simultaneously) 
Stage 3: a) The seller decides whether to challenge the buyers report 
b) Only if the seller decides not to challenge, the buyer has the opportunity 
to challenge the sellers report 
Stage 4: If any party has challenged the other party’s report, then the challenged 
party must decide whether to trade according to a prespecified price 
 
In stage 1 both players have to make their investment decision as described above. Since 
the buyer’s investment costs b are below the induced reduction of the seller’s production 
costs c and the seller’s investment costs are below the induced increase of the buyer’s 
product value, both investments are efficient from a social perspective. 
In stage 2 both players send messages to one another. In the buyer’s message, he reports 
his value of the product 𝑣 ∈ {50,100}. The buyer may not report the true valuation of the 
product so that 𝑣 ≠ 𝑣. Likewise, the seller reports his costs ?̂? ∈ {10,30}. Again, the seller 
does not need to report his true costs; hence it is possible that 𝑐 ≠ ?̂?. By sending their 
messages both players unavoidably make an indirect claim regarding one another’s 
investment decision as the buyer’s product value can only be 100 if the seller has invested 
and the seller’s production costs will be 10 if and only if the buyer has invested.  
As the structure of actions in stages 3 and 4 is quite complex, we have depicted its main 
elements in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Sequence of actions in stages 3 and 4 
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In stage 3 the seller has the opportunity to challenge the buyer’s report, i.e. he may claim 
that the buyer’s message is not true. If he does, the buyer must immediately pay a fine of 
60 tokens to the seller. Only if the seller does not challenge the buyers report, the buyer 
gets the opportunity to challenge the seller’s report. Again, if the buyer makes a challenge, 
the seller has to pay a fine of 60 tokens to the buyer. 
If neither player decides to challenge the other party’s report, the price of the product 
being traded between the seller and the buyer is determined to 𝑝 = 𝑣 + ?̂? − 45. Thus, in 
the case of no challenge, the profits are given by 
𝜋𝑆 = 100 + 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑠 = 100 + 𝑣 + (?̂? − 𝑐) − 𝑠 − 45  for the seller and 
𝜋𝐵 = 100 + 𝑣 − 𝑝 − 𝑏 = 100 + (𝑣 − 𝑣) − ?̂? − 𝑏 + 45    for the buyer.4  
Stage 4 will only be reached if any player has challenged the other player’s report. In this 
case the challenged player has to decide whether he wants to trade at a prespecified price. 
This trading decision serves to reveal the true amount of either the buyer’s product value 
or the sellers cost.  
If the seller has challenged the buyer’s message, the buyer may trade at a price of 50 < p = 
60 < 100 or he may not trade at all. If 𝑣 = 100, the buyer can earn 40 tokens by choosing 
to trade. If the player is perfectly rational and has purely selfish preferences, he would 
decide not to forgo this amount of money. Yet if 𝑣 = 50, trading will cause a loss of 10 
tokens so that a rational and selfish buyer will choose not to trade. If one assumes that 
players are rational and selfish, the decision of whether to trade reveals the true value of 
the product. In this sense we define the “revealed buyer’s value” (vrev) to be. 
𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑣 = {
100 if the buyer trades
50 if the buyer does not trade
. 
If the buyer’s revealed value is identical to his reported value, then the buyer’s message is 
considered as being true and the seller’s challenge of the buyer’s message is regarded as 
inappropriate; hence the seller has to pay a fine of 120 tokens. Yet this fine is not paid to 
the buyer but to a third party (in our experiment, to the experimental investigator by 
reducing the seller’s profits). If, in contrast, the buyer’s revealed value is not the same as 
his reported value, then the challenge is regarded as appropriate and the seller does not 
have to pay any fine at all. 
If the buyer has challenged the seller’s message, the seller has to make a trading decision. 
He can sell the product at a price of 10 < p = 20 < 30 or he can abstain from trading. If the 
true costs were 10, then a perfectly rational and selfish seller would decide to trade. In 
contrast, if the true costs were 30, the seller would prefer not to trade. Again, if we assume 
that all players are rational and selfish, the trading decision can be regarded as a revelation 
of the seller’s true costs. Accordingly, we define the “revealed costs” crev as  
                                                        
4 Note that we paid an additional amount of 100 to both players in each period because we wished to avoid 
participants taking losses.  
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𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑣 = {
10      if the seller trades
30    if he does not trade
. 
Again, if the seller’s revealed costs are the same as his reported costs, the seller’s message 
is considered to be true and the buyer’s challenge is regarded as inappropriate and the 
buyer has to pay a fine of 120 tokens (to the experimental investigator). If, in contrast, the 
seller’s revealed costs are not the same as his reported costs, the challenge is regarded as 
appropriate and the buyer does not have to pay any fine at all.  
The equilibrium of the Maskin mechanism game 
To understand the nature of this mechanism, we describe the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium beginning with the last stage and assuming that all players are perfectly 
rational and purely selfish. 
We have already shown that rational and selfish buyers will trade if and only if the 
products value is 100. In behaving this way, the buyer reveals his true product valuation. 
In the same way the seller reveals his true costs. Consequently, the challenging party will 
have to pay a fine of 120 if the challenged party’s message was true. Since this fine exceeds 
the amount of money the challenged party has to pay to the challenging player (60 tokens), 
the decision to challenge induces a severe loss when the other party has sent a true 
message. If, in contrast, the challenged party reveals that he has previously sent a false 
message, the challenger is rewarded for his decision to challenge. Therefore, buyers and 
sellers will challenge the other transaction partner in stage 3 if and only if the message 
was false. 
In stage 2 both players anticipate that false messages will be challenged and true messages 
will not. Because the challenged party has to pay a comparatively large fine, it does not 
pay to send a false message. Accordingly, both players will send true messages. 
Anticipating that both players will send true messages (𝑣 = 𝑣 and 𝑐 = ?̂?) and no player 
will challenge the other player’s message, players’ profit functions can be rewritten as 
follows:  
𝜋𝑆 = 100 + 𝑣(𝑠) − 𝑠 − 45 
 and 
𝜋𝐵 = 100 + 45 − 𝑐(𝑏) − 𝑏. 
Because 𝑣(30) − 30 = 70 > 50 = 𝑣(0) − 0, the sellers prefer to invest. In the same way 
buyers prefer to invest because −𝑐(15) − 15 = −25 > −30 = −𝑐(0) − 0. Consequently, 
in equilibrium both players will invest send true messages, neither player will challenge 
the other party’s message and total surplus is maximized. The equilibrium profits are 𝜋𝑆
∗ =
125 and 𝜋𝐵
∗ = 120.  
The vertical integration treatment 
In our second treatment we conducted an experimental game with a much simpler 
structure but an inefficient equilibrium. This treatment is very similar in spirit to the 
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initial approaches of property rights theory (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 
1990) and to transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985). 
The game consists of two stages. In stage 1 both players simultaneously make a takeover 
bid 𝑝𝐵, 𝑝𝑆 ∈ [0, 0.1, 0.2, … , 99.9, 100} for the other player’s firm. The subject making the 
higher offer buys the other player’s firm for a price equal to his own bid. In the event that 
both players make the same bid the winner of this auction is determined randomly. 
In stage 2 the owner of the firm decides whether to invest. The subject having sold his firm 
in stage 1 has no opportunity to act in stage 2. The investments of both players have 
exactly the same consequences as in the MM treatment, i.e. the seller’s investment s = 30 
increases the product value from 𝑣 = 50 to 𝑣 = 100 and the buyer’s investment 𝑏 = 15 
decreases production costs from c = 30 to c = 10. Recall that buyers can only make 
investment b and that sellers can only make investment s. The player’s profit functions are 
given by  
𝜋𝑆 = {
100 + 𝑣(𝑠) − 30 − 𝑠 − 𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟     in the case of seller ownership
100 + 𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟                                    in the case of buyer ownership
 
𝜋𝐵 = {
100 + 50 − 𝑐(𝑏) − 𝑏 − 𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟     in the case of buyer ownership
100 + 𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟                                    in the case of seller ownership
 . 
In equilibrium both types of players will invest if they own the firm because the increase 
in value (decrease in production cost) is larger than the corresponding investment costs. 
As the seller’s investment increases total surplus by more (20) than the buyer’s 
investment increases surplus (5), seller integration is more efficient than buyer 
integration. This has an impact on equilibrium behavior in stage 1: As the seller values the 
firm more than the buyer, his equilibrium bid is higher than the buyer’s equilibrium bid. 
It shows, however, that the auction game in stage 1 has multiple equilibria which are 
characterized by 12.5 ≤ 𝑝𝐵 ≤ 19.9 and 𝑝𝑆 = 𝑝𝐵 + 0.1. The correspondent equilibrium 
profits are given by 𝜋𝑆 = 140 − 𝑝𝑆 and 𝜋𝐵 = 100 + 𝑝𝑆. Because only one player has the 
opportunity to invest, total equilibrium profits in the VI treatment are lower than those in 
the MM treatment. In other words, vertical integration is only a second-best solution to 
the holdup problem in our experimental setting. However, in contrast to the mechanism 
in the MM treatment, vertical integration is a simple solution which may be more effective 
if subjects are only boundedly rational. 
2.2 Experimental procedures 
In the MM-treatment 120 subjects participated in six sessions and in the VI-treatment, 40 
subjects participated in two sessions. The participants were graduate and undergraduate 
students at Clausthal University of Technology from a wide variety of programs including 
Business Administration. In total, 160subjects participated in two treatments. The 
computerized experiment was programmed and conducted using zTree 3.2.12 (MM-
Treatment) and zTree 3.3.11 (VI-Treatment) software (Fischbacher 2007). In both 
treatments, the roles of the participants were fixed in a perfect stranger design. Half of the 
participants were assigned to be buyers and the others were sellers. No subject was 
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allowed to participate in more than one session. The exchange rate in both treatments was 
1 € for 65 tokens. All interactions in the lab were anonymous. 
In the MM treatment, a session required between 80 and 85 minutes. In addition to the 
experiment, this time included the reading time for the written instructions, completing 
the questionnaire and two practice periods. The announced time was 120 minutes. 
Subjects earned on average 17.02 € in 10 periods of play, including the show-up fee of 3 €. 
In the VI-Treatment, a session lasted between 45 and 50 minutes, again including reading 
time, completion of the questionnaire and two practice periods. The announced time was 
120 minutes. Subjects earned on average 20.74 € in a total of 10 rounds of play, including 
the show-up fee of 3 €. 
To ensure non-negative payoffs, in addition to the profits made in experiment, all 
participants received 100 tokens at the beginning of each period.  
3 Behavioral Predictions 
Since it is our objective to test the practicability of Maskin’s mechanism, our behavioral 
predictions are derived from the theoretical equilibrium.  
Maskin’s Mechanism (MM). In the fourth stage the buyers or the sellers make the trading 
decision, if they were previously challenged. Corresponding to the equilibrium, 
participants will trade (i.e., accept the price of 60 or 20) if and only if the buyer’s true 
value during the seller challenge is 𝑣 = 100 or the seller’s true cost during the buyer 
challenge is 𝑐 = 10. Thus trading decisions are predicted to be the result of the investment 
decisions from stage 1. Table 1 displays the values and costs for a given investment 
decision. 
Table 1: Cost and values by varying investment 
 investment Seller’s cost Buyer‘s value 
Seller’s 
investment 
0 - 50 
30 - 100 
Buyer‘ s 
investment 
0 30 - 
15 10 - 
 
Prediction 1. The challenged players will trade if either 𝑐 = 10 or 𝑣 = 100.  
In the third stage participants have the opportunity to make a challenge. In equilibrium, 
challenges will only occur if the investments do not match the messages. Otherwise the 
challenging party will face with a net fine payment amounting to 60 − 2 ⋅ 60 = −60. 
Prediction 2. A challenge only occurs if 𝑐 ≠ ?̂? or 𝑣 ≠ 𝑣. 
In stage 2 buyers and sellers simultaneously send messages regarding their own costs or 
values, respectively. Due to the perfect anticipation of the behavior in later stages, players 
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understand that sending a false signal induces a challenge by the other player. Because 
this leads to the payments of a large fine (60), which is higher than any potential profits 
due to lying, all players will send true messages in equilibrium.  
Prediction 3. Sellers will report their true costs ?̂? = 𝑐 and buyers will report their true 
values, i.e., 𝑣 = 𝑣. 
In the first stage sellers and buyers simultaneously decide whether to invest. Realizing 
that costs and values will be reported correctly and there will be no challenges, the price 
formula (𝑝 = 𝑣 + ?̂? − 45 = 𝑣 + 𝑐 − 45) ensures that investing is profitable for both 
players.  
Prediction 4. Sellers and Buyer will invest, i.e., 𝑠 = 30 and 𝑏 = 15 . 
Vertical Integration (VI). In the VI-treatment, investment decisions occur during the 
second stage. At this point in time, the two firms have already merged. Thus, the owner’s 
payoff is no longer dependent on the other player’s behavior so that his investment 
decision is no longer influenced by strategic reasoning. Consequently, the firm owner will 
make an efficient investment decision:  
Prediction 5a. In the VI treatment the owner of the firm will invest efficiently, i.e., 𝑏 = 15 
or  𝑠 = 30 . 
In stage 1 buyers and sellers compete for ownership. The participants offer takeover bids 
for one another’s firms. The agent with the larger offer “wins” the auction, pays his offer 
to the other player and becomes the sole owner of the integrated firm. Because the seller’s 
investment is more productive, his valuation of the firm exceeds that of the buyer. 
Consequently, the seller will outbid the buyer. Due to the existence of multiple equilibria, 
we obtain:  
Prediction 5b. The auction will lead to seller integration. The equilibrium takeover bids will 
be 12.5 ≤ 𝑝𝐵 ≤ 19.9 and 𝑝𝑆 = 𝑝𝐵 + 0.1.  
The mechanism is designed to ensure efficient behavior that solves the holdup problem. 
In our experiment, vertical integration can only partly solve the holdup problem because 
only one of the parties can make an investment.  






Prediction 6 is at the core of this paper as it refers to the main question of whether 
Maskin’s mechanism can be trusted to work reliably in practice.  
4 Results  
In this section we present the experimental results of both treatments.  
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Result 1. Prediction 1 is rejected: in a significant number of cases, buyers trade despite that 
their product value is only 50 or sellers trade despite that their production costs are 30.  
Table 2 reports the trading decisions in stage 4. In nearly 40% of the observations, buyers 
deviate from the predicted equilibrium behavior. For the sellers, precisely 37.5% of the 
decisions are not in accordance with SPNE. As a consequence, in the early stages of the 
game, players cannot rely on subsequent equilibrium behavior.5  
Table 2: Trade decisions in stage 4 
 MM 
 Buyer challenges Seller challenges 
Equilibrium behavior 111 130 
Disequilibrium behavior 72 78 
Percentage of equilibrium 
decisions 
60.7 % 62.5% 
 
Result 2. Prediction 2 is rejected: there is a non-negligible number of observations in which 
players challenge the other party while the message was true or players do not challenge the 
other player despite the message being false.  
According to our equilibrium prediction, players only challenge the other subject’s 
message if the message is false. Table 3 shows that the experimental behavior frequently 
deviates from equilibrium predictions. Buyers do not make equilibrium decisions in more 
than one-third of cases, while the corresponding figure for sellers is 31.2 percent.6  







Equilibrium choices 243 413 
Disequilibrium choices 149 187 
Percentage of equilibrium 
choices 
61.9 % 68.8% 
 
Result 3. Prediction 3 is rejected: on average, one-third of the messages are false.  
                                                        
5 In a logit regression we attempted to identify variables that might explain experimental behavior in stage 
4. However, none of the explanatory variables (prior behavior in the same period and some other variables) 
were significant at conventional levels.  
6 We conducted a logit regression revealing a significant impact of one’s own investment and the 
truthfulness of the other player’s message on the rationality of the sellers’ decision to challenge. Yet this 
result does not hold for buyers’ decisions of whether to challenge.  
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Table 4 indicates that in nearly 30 percent of cases the buyers sent false messages 
concerning their product valuation. In more than 35% of the cases sellers do not report 
their true costs.7  
Table 4: Quantities of messages in accordance with investment decisions 
 MM 
 Buyers’ messages Sellers’ messages 
True 437 387 
False 163 213 
Percentage of true 
messages 
72.8 % 64.5% 
 
Result 4. Prediction 4 is rejected: in 38.9 percent of the observations, players did not invest.  
According to equilibrium predictions the mechanism is able to solve the holdup problem 
perfectly such that buyers (b = 15) and sellers (s = 30) will always invest. Yet table 5 shows 
that this is far from being true. Buyers did not invest in 40.7 percent of cases and, sellers 
did not invest in 37.2 percent of cases. Consequently, the mechanism provides no 
behaviorally workable first-best solution to the holdup problem.  
Table 5: Quantities of investment decisions in the MM treatment 
 MM 
 Buyers Sellers 
Efficient investment  
(s = 30 or b = 15) 
356 377 
No investment 
(s = 0 or b = 0) 
244 223 
Percentage of efficient 
investments  
59.3 % 62.8% 
 
Having presented all results concerning participants’ behavior in the MM treatment, it 
remains to be shown whether theory performs better in the VI treatment. Let us begin the 
description of behavior in stage 2 of the treatment, the investment decision.  
Result 5a. Prediction 5a is rejected: in 15 percent of VI treatment cases, players did not 
invest.  
According to equilibrium predictions both players will always invest once they own the 
firm. Table 6 indicates that this is not the case as there is a non-negligible number of cases 
in which the owner of the firm makes no investment. The percentage of non-investing 
                                                        
7 In logit regressions, we found that the investment behavior of the other party has a significant impact on 
the truthfulness of messages.  
13 
buyers and sellers is approximately 15 percent which is far less than in the MM treatment 
but still too high to claim that firm owners always invest.  
 
Table 6:  Quantities of investment decisions in the VI-treatment 
 VI 
 Buyers Sellers 
Efficient investment  
(s = 30 or b = 15) 
85 85 
No investment 
(s = 0 or b = 0) 
16 14 
Percentage of efficient 
investment 
84.16 % 85.86 % 
 
Result 5b. Prediction 5b is rejected: in stage 1, buyers win the auction in the majority of 
cases. In addition takeover bids are well above the predicted level (12.5 ≤ 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 20).  
According to equilibrium predictions, sellers will always win the auction in stage 1 
because their investments are more productive than those of the buyers. Table 7 reports 
that in 101 out of 200 cases buyers win the auction and become the firm owners. In 
contrast to the MM treatment, we observe some learning in the VI treatment. In the final 
three periods of play, sellers win the takeover auction in approximately 62 percent of the 
cases. Yet, even in these periods, there are clearly too many buyer integrations to confirm 
the hypothesis that sellers will always become firm owners.  
 
Table 7: Takeover bids and ownership structures  
 VI 
 Buyers Sellers 
Mean takeover bid 28.60 25.24 
Number of auction wins 101 99 
Percentage of auction wins 50.5 % 49.5 % 
 
Thus far we have shown that the participants’ behavior deviates substantially from 
equilibrium predictions. It remains to be shown, however, whether the use of the 
mechanism improves economic performance. We employ two benchmarks to assess the 
efficiency of the participants’ behavior in both treatments. The first is the first-best 
solution and yields the total profit of 245. The Maskin mechanism was originally designed 
to achieve this result. The second benchmark, the zero investment baseline, consists of 
both players’ payoffs in the case that neither of them invests and neither challenges the 
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other. Here the sum of total profits equals 220. In essence, this benchmark serves as the 
case in which there is no institutional arrangement to solve the holdup problem. 
Result 6. Prediction 6 is rejected: total profits in the VI treatment are significantly higher 
than in the MM treatment. 
Table 8 shows that the profits in the VI treatment are between the two benchmark cases 
in the last three periods. In the previous periods, and even in the last three periods, the 
buyers’ bids are above equilibrium offer. As we observe some non-investment by firm 
owners, total surplus is slightly below the equilibrium of the VI treatment. As an 
instrument to alleviate the holdup problem, vertical integration may best be regarded as 
an imperfect but workable solution. 
In contrast, the Maskin mechanism completely fails to solve the holdup problem. The 
profits of both buyers and sellers are well below the zero investment benchmark. Thus, 
implementing the mechanism does not improve but instead impairs economic 
performance. Furthermore, the subgame perfect equilibrium path was only realized in 63 
(out of 600) interactions.  
 









MM treatment 98.03 96.97 84.24 83.28 
VI treatment 107.55 115.79 123.08 117.04 
First-best equilibrium 120 125 
Zero investment case  
(no institutional arrangement) 
115 105 
 
Summarizing the results of our experiment, (1) the implementation of the Maskin 
mechanism leads to worse payoffs than ignoring the holdup problem entirely, and (2) 
without exception, all predictions based on equilibrium theory must be rejected. 
Consequently, the question arises whether there is a better approach to explain the 
behavior of subjects in our experiment. In the next section we attempt to show that the 
logit agent quantal response equilibrium (LAQRE) is able to reconstruct the basic features 
of the behavior and economic performance in our experiment. 
5 Logit agent quantal response equilibrium  
We began our economic experiment under the presumption that Maskin’s mechanism is 
far too complicated to be employed in practice. Due to the successful use of the logit 
quantal response equilibrium as an alternative to the Nash equilibrium, it is currently 
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widely accepted as a static benchmark (cf Camerer et al. 2004); hence its application 
needs no further justification.  
In logit quantal response equilibria (LQRE) subjects do not perfectly optimize but choose 
each feasible strategy with a strictly positive probability. The probability prki of subject k 
choosing a particular strategy ai increases in its expected utility and is described by the 










Subject k’s expected utility, in turn, depends on his expectations of the other players’ 
probabilities of choosing their feasible strategies 𝜎𝜅𝛾: 𝐸𝑈𝑘𝑖 = 𝑓(𝜎11, 𝜎12, … , 𝜎𝜅𝛾, … , 𝜎𝑛𝑚) 
for all players and all strategies. In addition to the logit choice rule LQRE includes a 
consistency requirement: 𝜎𝜅𝛾 = 𝑝𝑟𝜅𝛾. In other words, players’ expectations of other 
players’ behavior are correct (in a probabilistic sense).  
The parameter 𝜇 in the logit choice function measures the players’ degree of rationality. 
The smaller the parameter value, the higher is the degree of rationality assumed. If 𝜇 
approaches zero, LQRE coincides with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If, in 
contrast, 𝜇 approaches infinity, each feasible strategy is chosen with equal probability. 
The additional parameter provides an additional degree of freedom. Typically the 
parameter is estimated for each game separately by using maximum likelihood 
techniques. 
The concept of logit agent quantal response equilibrium (LAQRE) extends LQRE by 
accounting for the dynamic structure of the game. This extension is achieved by using the 
agent normal form of the game and calculating its LQRE. In the following we apply LAQRE 
to the experimental games in the two treatments. Our maximum likelihood estimations of 
the rationality parameter are 𝜇 = 42.17 for the game played in the MM treatment and 𝜇 =
27.54 for the VI treatment. 
5.1. The LAQRE of the Maskin mechanism game 
The LAQRE probabilities for the trading decision in stage 4 are presented in table 9. 
Clearly, the LAQRE probabilities are much closer to the corresponding empirical values 
than the predictions of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). This phenomenon 
is particularly the case for the buyers’ decisions to trade during seller challenges. 







 Buyer challenges (i.e. sellers decide whether to trade) 
c = 10 71.9 55.9 100 
c = 30 65.5 44.1 0 
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 Seller challenges (i.e., buyers decide whether to trade) 
v = 50 44.4 44.1 0 
v = 100 68.8 72.1 100 
 
In the case of buyer challenges LAQRE still clearly outperforms SPNE but the distance 
between the LAQRE probabilities and the empirical values is also substantial. When c = 
30 the distance is 21.4 percent. It is important to understand that Maskin’s mechanism 
critically depends on a behavior in accordance with the SPNE in stage 4 because only this 
clear-cut equilibrium behavior can serve as a reliable revelation of true costs and values, 
respectively. Deviations from standard Nash equilibrium lead to modified incentives at 
earlier stages of the game and thereby destroy incentives to invest in stage 1. 
In stage 3 the seller (and subsequently the buyer if the seller does not challenge) has to 
decide whether to challenge the other player’s message. Since Maskin’s mechanism 
crucially depends on the identity of true costs and reported costs and on the identity of 
true values and reported values, we have to distinguish four constellations of true costs 
and values and four constellations of reported costs and values. In addition, we have to 
distinguish between buyers’ (BC) and sellers’ decisions to challenge (SC). Table 10 
provides an overview of the empirical data, the LAQRE and the SPNE for all 32 
constellations. The upper line in each cell provides the value of the SPNE, followed by the 
LAQRE and the empirical relative frequency. The empirical values in square brackets are 
based on a subsample of fewer than or exactly 5 cases. 
To quantitatively compare the predictive power of SPNE and LAQRE, we calculated the 
mean absolute deviation (MAD) between the theoretical and empirical probabilities. 
Taking into account all 32 cells we obtain 𝑀𝐴𝐷𝐿𝐴𝑄𝑅𝐸 = 0,1242 and 𝑀𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑁𝐸 = 0, .3394. 
Ignoring the cells in which the number of empirical cases is smaller than five, we obtain 
𝑀𝐴𝐷𝐿𝐴𝑄𝑅𝐸 = 0.1205 and 𝑀𝐴𝐷𝑆𝑃𝑁𝐸 = 0.3351. Obviously, LAQRE outperforms SPNE. 
Greater deviations in a few cells notwithstanding, LAQRE can generally reconstruct the 
subjects’ challenge behavior in our experiment.  
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Table 10: The decision of whether to challenge the other party’s message  
  c = 10; v = 100 c = 30; v = 100 c = 10; v = 50 c = 30; v = 50 






























































































































Let us now turn to the contents of the messages. At this stage of the game we can 
distinguish four cases: costs and values can be either high or low. Table 11 shows of the 
probabilities of sending true messages according to SPNE, LAQRE and the empirical data. 
Once again, LAQRE fits the data much better than SPNE. Taking the mean absolute 
deviation over all eight cells as a measure of the goodness of fit, LAQRE (MAD =0.1262) is 
clearly closer to the empirical data than SPNE (MAD = 0.3235). We find only two cells (𝑐 =
30, 𝑣 = 100, ?̂?; and 𝑐 = 30, 𝑣 = 50, ?̂?) in which SPNE is closer to the data. 
 
Table 11: LAQRE in stage 2 (sending messages) 
  Probabilities of true messages (?̂? = 𝑐 or 𝑣 = 𝑣 ) 
  
𝑐 = 10; 
𝑣 = 100 
𝑐 = 30; 
𝑣 = 100 
𝑐 = 10; 
𝑣 = 50 
𝑐 = 30; 


































Table 12 shows the LAQRE probabilities of investment and players’ expected profits in 
comparison to SPNE and the participants’ behavior in our experiment. Again, LAQRE is 
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much closer to the empirical data. Yet the difference between the relative frequency of 
buyers’ investments and the investment probabilities according to LAQRE remains rather 
large. Most important, LAQRE can explain the surprisingly low value of mean profits in 
our experiment. LAQRE explains deviations from equilibrium behavior at all stages of the 
experimental game and thereby explains the occurrence of inefficient challenges and the 
inefficient payment of fines. Consequently, expected profits in the LAQRE are well below 
100. In other words: completely ignoring the holdup problem and thereby realizing 
maximum underinvestment induces larger profits (105/115) than using Maskin’s 
mechanism.  
 
Table 12: Investment probabilities and expected profits in the LAQRE  
 Investment probabilities 
 Data LAQRE SPNE 
Sellers 0,5933 0.4115 1 
Buyers 0,6283 0.4507 1 
 Expected profits 
 Data LAQRE SPNE 
Sellers 84,22 85,62 125 
Buyers 98,03 84,29 120 
 
We have demonstrated that the LAQRE provides a much better fit to the data than the 
SPNE. It is unsurprising that the LAQRE, as a generalization of SPNE that has an additional 
degree of freedom (parameter 𝜇), yields a better fit for the entire game. Yet it is not self-
evident that LAQRE outperforms SPNE in all stages of the game which is true for our MM 
treatment. Furthermore, the LAQRE not only provides a better fit but also inverts the 
normative evaluation of the Maskin mechanism, and this is perfectly in accordance with 
the data from our experiment. The Maskin mechanism is simply overly complicated to 
reliably work with ordinary individuals who are only boundedly rational. Yet mechanism 
design does not take into account any limits of human rationality and thereby 
overestimates the efficiency of its solutions. 
5.2 The LAQRE in the Vertical Integration game 
Stage 2 of the VI treatment consists of a large trivial investment decision by the owner of 
the firm. He need only understand that his investment costs are lower than the benefit of 
the investment, and hence it is beneficial to invest. Table 13 shows that the subjects in the 
VI treatment generally understood this. The average empirical investment probability is 
approximately 85 percent whereas LAQRE, assuming that 𝜇 = 27.54, predicts 
substantially smaller investment probabilities. Consequently, SPNE outperforms LAQRE 
in stage 2 of this treatment.  
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Table 13: Investment probabilities in the VI treatment 
 Data LAQRE SPNE 
Sellers 0.8586 0.6740 1 
Buyers 0.8416 0.5453 1 
 
The ownership of the firm is auctioned in stage 1 of the VI game. Table 14 shows that both 
buyers and sellers submitted substantially higher bids than predicted by SPNE. By and 
large, LAQRE captures players’ overbidding quite well. 
Table 14: Mean takeover bids 
 Data LAQRE SPNE 
Sellers 25.235 26.020 𝑝𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 𝑝𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 + 0.1 and 
Buyers 28.598 23.864 12.5 ≤ 𝑝𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 ≤ 19.9 
 
LAQRE not only approximates the means of takeover bids but also provides an 
approximate estimate of the distribution of bids. Figure 2 shows the relative frequencies 
of takeover bids and the corresponding LAQRE probabilities. One can see that the shapes 
of the distributions are similar. Yet LAQRE does not capture the preferred choice of 
prominent numbers as takeover bids. Obviously, multiples of five are overrepresented in 
the distribution of takeover bids. Furthermore, the peak of the LAQRE distribution lies left 
to the peak of takeover bids for buyers and sellers. 
 
Figure 2: Relative bid frequencies and LAQRE probabilities of takeover bids 
  
  Sellers      Buyers 
 
In summary, the LAQRE of the VI game can explain why (a) we observe many cases of 
buyer integrations and (b) takeover bids are well above the level predicted by SPNE. Yet 
it underestimates the efficiency of investment decisions in stage 2. 
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6 Discussion  
The complementary papers by Aghion et al (2014) and Fehr et al. (2014) refer to social 
preferences to explain the failure of Maskin’s mechanism and the Moore-Repullo 
mechanism. In particular, they emphasize that reciprocity or preferences for retaliation 
might explain their participants’ behavior. It seems to work well in their experiment. 
However, it does not work as well for our data.  
To show this, we concentrate our discussion on two versions of social preferences: 
reciprocity and inequity aversion. Reciprocity captures the idea that people desire to 
punish uncooperative behavior (negative reciprocity) and reward cooperative behavior 
(positive reciprocity). Inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999), in contrast, 
extends the utility function by an additional argument: the difference in the players’ 
payoffs. Any increase in the absolute value of payoff differences decreases utility of 
inequity averse players.  
Take the following case: The seller has invested, the buyer has not invested in stage 1 and 
both players have sent true messages: 𝑐 = ?̂? = 30 and 𝑣 = 𝑣 = 100. The seller has not 
challenged the buyer’s message and now it is up to the buyer to decide whether to 
challenge the seller’s message. The following cases are possible under these 
circumstances:  
Table 15: Payoffs (𝝅𝑺, 𝝅𝑩)  
 Seller sells (p = 20) Seller does not sell 
Buyer challenge (0, 240) (10, 40) 
No buyer challenge (125, 115) 
 
If the buyer does not challenge the seller’s message he gets a payoff of 115, slightly less 
than the seller (125). If the buyer challenges and the seller sells the buyer realizes a profit 
or 240 and the seller gets nothing. If the seller does not sell the product after a challenge 
the seller earns 10 and the buyer gets 40. Let us now analyze the seller’s decision of 
whether to sell the product. What kind of players would choose to sell the product?  
Selling the product for p = 20, i.e., selling below cost (30) decreases the seller’s profits, 
thus selfish players will never sell the product in this special case. What about inequity 
aversion? The payoff difference in case of selling the product is much higher than in case 
of not selling. Therefore, inequity averse sellers will suffer an additional disutility if they 
sell the product under these circumstances. As payoffs are greater and the payoff 
difference is smaller if the sellers don’t sell, inequity averse players will not sell in this 
buyer challenge.  
Then, what about reciprocity? The buyer’s decision to challenge despite the seller having 
sent a true message can hardly be understood as cooperative behavior. Quite the contrary, 
a common interpretation of this “unjustified” challenge would be that the buyer has 
behaved uncooperatively and deserves a punishment. Again, reciprocal sellers will not 
sell the product. In summary, all types of sellers will prefer not to sell to the buyer.  
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As the buyer cannot expect sellers to sell, why should he challenge the seller’s message if 
this decreases his profits from 115 to 40? One might guess that he wants to act 
reciprocally by himself. Yet this argument does not work here because the seller has 
behaved cooperatively in all previous stages: the seller has invested, sent a true message 
and not challenged the buyer’s message. What more could he do? Inequity aversion can 
also not serve as an explanation for a buyer challenge because payoff differences in a 
buyer challenge are greater than in the case without a buyer challenge.  
In summary, no rational seller type (selfish, inequity averse or reciprocal) will sell the 
product in our specific case and no rational buyer type will challenge the seller’s message. 
However, in our experiment 50 percent of the buyers have decided in favor of a challenge 
under these circumstances!  
A similar analysis can be made for other cases as well; e.g., if we have equilibrium behavior 
in the first two stages, meaning 𝑐 = ?̂? = 10 and 𝑣 = 𝑣 = 100, we find buyer challenges in 
29 percent of the cases. Again, social preferences can hardly explain this deviation from 
equilibrium. Consequently, reciprocity and inequity aversion are unable to reconstruct 
central characteristics of behavior in our experiment; hence we prefer bounded 
rationality as an explanatory approach to reconstruct our data.  
7 Conclusion  
Several decades ago institutional economics emerged as an approach emphasizing that 
bounded rationality should be at the core of the research program (Williamson 1975, 
1985). Beginning with the seminal paper by Grossman and Hart (1986), the emphasis 
shifted to game theoretic models with perfectly rational players. Oliver Hart (1990, 696) 
claimed that “bounded rationality in the sense that agents have limited cognitive, 
computational or comprehension skills is not” a crucial component of the theory of 
institutions. The research program called the “theory of incomplete contracts” emerged 
and evolved, and many ingenious solutions to the holdup problem were introduced. 
Subsequently, papers by Maskin and Tirole (1999), Maskin and Moore (1999) and Maskin 
(2002) raised doubts regarding the foundations of this program by introducing a 
mechanism ensuring efficient equilibria. 
Maskin (2002) emphasizes that he does not believe that we should ignore the results of 
this strand of literature which he seems to consider valuable. Furthermore, he supposes 
that bounded rationality could be a potentially fruitful explanation for incompleteness. 
We agree with Maskin that the theory of incomplete contracts retains substantial heuristic 
value. Furthermore, the results of our experiment strongly confirm Maskin’s second 
assessment (referring to bounded rationality) and show that implementing the proposed 
mechanism may lead to disastrous economic consequences. Traditional game theoretic 
equilibrium analysis cannot account for our experimental data. However, the application 
of LAQRE, which explicitly accounts for players mistakes, can reconstruct the important 
results of our experiment: LAQRE outperforms SPNE as a predictor of behavior at all 
stages of the MM treatment.  
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We regard our findings as evidence for the unfeasibility of overly complex institutional 
arrangements. In our case the use of the complex mechanism does not improve 
performance, rather it worsens it: participants’ payoffs are even smaller than in an 
institutional setting that completely ignores the holdup problem! In contrast, the simple 
but inefficient solution of vertical integration leads to a significant improvement in 
economic performance. 
As a first consequence, we submit that – in stark contrast to Hart (1990) – bounded 
rationality is a crucial component of the theory of the firm and that of institutions in 
general. In some respects Williamson (1985) provided a deeper and better understanding 
than the current theory of incomplete contracts. 
The second conclusion we wish to draw is that solutions to incentive problems must be 
simple to be workable with human players. Our final conclusion is that most solutions to 
the different versions of the holdup problem should be reassessed in light of our findings. 
By this we mean that the complexity of institutional arrangements must be taken into 
account and it is difficult to imagine that first-best solutions exist. Some important steps 
have already been taken in this direction: the contributions of Hoppe and Schmitz (2011), 
(2013a) and (2013b) provide particularly valuable insights.  
Although LAQRE clearly outperforms SPNE, there remains a substantial potential for 
further improvements in predicting and explaining subjects behavior in contract theoretic 
experiments. First, it seems promising to rely more heavily on learning models. Second, a 
combination of bounded rationality and social preferences may be able to fill in some of 
the gaps that remain in our analysis of this experiment. Finally, we may be able to deepen 
our understanding by using tools other than equilibrium analysis, e.g. agent-based models 
of organizations might serve as a useful complement to (behavioral and traditional) game 
theory. We eagerly anticipate works pursuing these directions.  
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